The WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is a part of IEEE 802.11 standard designed for protecting over the air communication. While almost all of the WLAN (Wireless LAN) cards and the APs (Access Points) support WEP, a serious key recovery attack (aka FMS attack) was identified by Fluhrer et al. The attack was then extended and implemented as WEP cracking tools. The key recovery attacks can basically be prevented by skipping certain IVs (Initial Values) called weak IVs, but the problem is that there exist huge amount of key-dependent weak IVs and the patterns of them have not been fully identified yet. The difficult part is that a naive approach to identify the key-dependent weak IVs requires the exhaustive search of IVs and WEP keys, and hence is infeasible. On the other hand, it might be feasible to skip the key-dependent weak IVs for the currently set WEP key but this reveals information on the WEP key from the skipped patterns. To skip them safely, the patterns of the key-dependent weak IVs must be identified in the first place. In this paper, we analyze the famous condition for IVs and WEP keys to be weak in the FMS attack, i.e. 0
Introduction
The WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is a part of IEEE 802.11 standard [12] designed for protecting over the air communication. While almost all of the WLAN (Wireless LAN) cards and the APs (Access Points) support WEP, a serious key recovery attack (aka FMS attack) was identified by Fluhrer et al. [7] . The attack was then extended and implemented in [1]- [5] , [15] . The key recovery attacks can basically be prevented * by skipping certain IVs (Initial Values) called weak IVs, but the problem is that there exist huge amount of key-dependent weak IVs and the patterns of them have not been fully identified yet.
A naive approach to identify all the key-dependent weak IVs for "all the WEP keys" would be to try all the combinations of the IVs and the WEP keys and to see if they satisfy certain conditions employed in the attacks. This approach, however, requires exhaustive search of IVs and WEP keys and is computationally infeasible. Another approach would be to skip all the IVs meeting the condition but only for "the currently set WEP key." This approach may be feasible, but causes another vulnerability that the skipped IVs reveal information on the WEP key (since the skipped IVs depend on the WEP key). To skip IVs safely, the patterns of the key-dependent weak IVs must be identified in the first place. Once such patterns are obtained, the safe skip patterns can be obtained using them.
In this paper, we analyze the famous condition for IVs and WEP keys to be weak in the FMS attack, i.e.
≤ S [1] ≤ t < t and S [1] + S [S [1]]
= t (cf. Sect. 2.3 for more details), which is employed in the current versions of the publicly available WEP cracking tools [1]- [5] commonly. Then we theoretically trace it back to the patterns of IVs and WEP keys. Once such weak patterns are identified, they can be converted into the safe skip patterns that immunize WEP against the key-recovery attacks employing the condition without revealing the information on the WEP key.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In Sect. 2, we briefly review WEP, RC4 and the key recovery attacks on WEP. In Sect. 3, we explain how to trace the condition back to the patterns of IVs and WEP keys.
WEP and Its Key Recovery Attack
In this section, we briefly review WEP and its key recovery attacks. (For details, cf. the specification [12] and the papers [7] , [8] , [15] .)
Data Encapsulation Format in WEP
Full description of WEP is available from [12] . What is needed here is its data encapsulation format, which is given as follows:
where || denotes concatenation of the right and the left data, and ⊕ denotes exclusive-or. A data packet m is encapsulated as follows: first m is concatenated with its 32-bit cyclic redundancy check CRC(m). Then (m||CRC(m)) is exclusive-ored with a pseudo-random sequence denoted by RC4(IV||K ) where RC4() is the RC4 key-stream generator, IV is a 24-bit initial value and K is a symmetric-key. IVs should be unique to each other so that RC4(IV||K ) can be unique even if K is fixed. K is a symmetric-key (called WEP key), which is either shared in advance as a password among authorized members or given by another mechanism, such as 802.1x [13] or WPA-PSK [6] . Let k denote the size of K = (IV||K ) in byte, which is either 8-bytes (64-bits) or 16-bytes (128-bits) † . In this paper, we assume k = 16.
Description of RC4
RC4 is a word oriented stream cipher. Its word size is defined by n and through out this paper we assume n = 8, i.e. one word is 8-bits, which is the most popular setting in RC4 including the case of WEP. RC4 consists of two algorithms: KSA (KeyScheduling Algorithm) and PRGA (Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm). Their algorithms are shown in Figs. 1 and 2 respectively (where S [i] and K[i] denote the i-th bytes of S and K, respectively). The KSA accepts a key K of k bytes and then shuffles its inner buffer S of 2 8 bytes according to K. The PRGA accepts the shuffled S and then generates a pseudo-random sequence while shuffling S again.
The security of RC4 has been studied by a lot of researchers [9] . While some unwanted properties have been identified, such as the distinguishability from a real random stream, no critical vulnerability has been identified yet on the typical usage of RC4. RC4 in WEP is, however, out of the typical usage (since it opens a part of the RC4 key to the public as an IV) and this exposes the rest of the RC4 key (the WEP key K ) to the risk of recovery [7] .
Input: a key K of k bytes Output: a buffer S of 2 8 bytes Input: a buffer S of 2 8 bytes and an output size s Output: a sequence Z j := 0 
Key Recovery Attack on WEP
In this subsection, we briefly review the key recovery attack identified by Fluhrer et al. (cf. [7] , [8] , [15] for details). It uses the correlation between certain positions of the WEP key and the first output byte of the PRGA. The correlation becomes higher than the average for certain IVs (called weak IVs). Thus by collecting a lot of pairs of such weak IVs and the corresponding first output bytes, the WEP key can be recovered. We explain why certain
Let 
One can easily verify that S *
in KSA, is given as the first output byte of PRGA if the above two conditions are satisfied. The first condition holds with probability around 0.05 [7] . Thus (1) and (2) 
Then (4) is generalized to
for guessing not only
In practice, some variants exist on the implementation of the key-recovery attack. We categorize them as follows:
Basic variant: uses the IVs that lead to both (3) and (5) .
We call such IVs key-independent weak IVs (since they are independent of the WEP key).
FMS:
uses not only the key-independent weak IVs but also key-dependent weak IVs. 
where the condition for the Basic corresponds to t = 2. Skipping only the key-independent weak IVs is not enough to prevent this attack since even if
are unknown this attack still works by exhaustively searching
. This is known as the guessing-early-key-bytes approach [15] . Korek: uses new conditions recently identified by Korek.
(To the best of our knowledge, Korek's result has not been published in a paper but appeared in the source codes of [1], [2] , [5] . We omit the details due to the limitation of pages, but some conditions are not stable and further analysis is needed.)
How to Trace Conditions Back to Weak IVs
In this section, we analyze the condition, (6) and (7), and then trace it back to the patterns of weak IVs and weak WEP keys theoretically.
Condition and States to Be Led
For simplicity, we abbreviate "a ≡ b mod 2 8 " to "a = b" and omit subscripts of j and S if obvious. We rewrite the condition to be weak in the FMS, i.e. (6) and (7), using a new variable u as follows: 
where 0 ≤ u ≤ t < t.
One can easily verify that satisfying (8) and (9) is equivalent to satisfying (6) and (7). We prove the following theorem on the new variable u:
Theorem 1: (8) and (9) do not hold if u = 1 or t = 2u.
, and this contradicts with t ≥ 3. Note that K [2] (or IV [2] ) has already been known and cannot be a target byte to crack. The other condition t = 2u is obtained from the fact that S is a permutation among distinct values, i.e.
Thus t − u u and t 2u. (8) and (9) 
Taking Theorem 1 into account, we summarize the patterns satisfying both (8) and (9) for 0 ≤ u ≤ 9 in Table 1 . (The cases for 10 ≤ u ≤ 15 can be obtained similarly.) [2] ) are known, only the rows of u = 0 and 2 are available in Table 1 since 0 ≤ u ≤ t = 2 and u 1. The row of u = 2, however, cannot be used to guess K[t] for t = 4 due to t 2u as shown in the column of "Exception" in the We start by considering the following simpler scenario first:
Definition 2: (One-target-value-one-target-box Scenario) Let x denote a target value and S [y] denote a target box. The one-target-value-one-target-box scenario is a scenario where x should be placed into S [y] with some operations.
We also define: We summarize all the available operations for satisfying (8) and (9) in Table 2 where "Fish x" and "Kick x" in the column for S [y], y ∈ {1, u} denote the swap operations between S [y] and x with the fish-up type and the kick-in type respectively, and "Exchange u with t − u" denotes the swap operation between u and t − u with the exchange type. 
Operation
Operations for Type Table 4 FF operation for 1 < u and u < t − u. Table 5 FF operation for 1 < u and t − u < u.
IVs and WEP Keys Invoking Each Operation
In the previous section, we listed up all the available operations, FF, KF, FK, KK, FE and KE in Table 2 . In this section, we show the concrete moves of j i corresponding to the operations and then obtain the combinations of IVs and WEP keys that realize the moves. We show the moves of j i in the left columns of Tables 3  to 10 respectively where j l 1 <i≤l 2 denotes j i for l 1 < i ≤ l 2 and j i x 1 , x 2 denotes j i x 1 and j i x 2 . One can check that each move of j i follows the operation. The move of j i can be converted into the combination of K[] and S [] by substituting (10) (that holds in KSA) in the equations in the left columns of Table 6 FK operation for 1 < u and Tables 3 to 10 . We summarize the results in the middle and right columns respectively in each table. E.g. in Table 3 , the moves of j i are j 0 = t, j 1 = t, j 2 0, 1 and so on. By substituting (10) 
0, 1 are obtained where the second and the third equations give Table 4 Table 4 gives j 1 + 
Repeating the similar procedures in each operation type, we obtained the constraints on IVs and WEP keys to be weak. We summarize them in Table 11 . (We also show some examples derived from this table in App. Appendix.) The famous weak pattern (K[0], K[1]) = (t, 255) identified in [7] corresponds to FF of u = 0 in our categorization, and then the pattern identified in [10] corresponds to FF of u = t − 1 in our categorization † . Other than them, there exist KK of 0 < u < t − 1, KF, FK, KK, FE and KE. The IVs to skip can be obtained by analyzing the Table 11 and this is our further study.
Conclusion
We analyzed the condition for IVs and WEP keys to be weak † The pattern identified in [11] is the incomplete version of FF and the ability of it is too low to recover the 104-bit WEP key in practice. in the FMS attack and then theoretically traced it back to the patterns of IVs and WEP keys. The obtained patterns include the key-dependent weak IVs whose patterns have never been identified. Once weak patterns are identified, they can be used to obtain the safe skip patterns that immunize WEP against the key-recovery attacks. Obtaining such safe skip patterns and verifying how effectively they work (or not) are our further study. 
